Sometimes I am encouraged by perceived progress in our State department’s relationship to the great ‘otherness’ that is the rest of the world. The relaxing of sanctions imposed on Libya, a commitment to dialogue with North Korea (DPRK), good relations with China and Russia are but a few examples of this trend.
But then I turn the page and read about rhetorical escalation with Iran and Venezuela, or the building of a fence along our border with Mexico. What is one supposed to conclude from such conflicting messages? We seem to be caught somewhere between being realists and idealists, halfway between isolation and globalism. We are creating difficult, tense relationships with those countries that have vast natural resource reserves, ones we will become increasingly dependent on as time progresses. So what good does it do us to act like this?
Let’s take a look at Iran: Popular revolutionary government since 1979, theocratic leadership, and a signatory member of the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has acted on its internationally granted right, in accord with the NPT, to develop a peaceful nuclear power program. So far they have enriched Uranium to 3.9% – a far cry from the 80-90% required for nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Agency (IAEA) and its leader M. El Baradai have declared that there is no conclusive evidence that Iran is preparing weapons development. They have, by the way, endorsed a path of incentive diplomacy to alleviate the tension, rather than endorsing U.S. favored punitive sanctions.
We should not however, in all this rhetoric, lose site of what is really going on here. Iranians have not simply chosen this moment to rear their head and begin to flex muscle. They have done so because America destroyed the regional balance of power by invading Iraq, a country which had for sometime kept Iran in check. Neither side is able to put the other in mate. Not only that, but America got itself bogged down. This has created a power vacuum in the region and Iran is taking the steps to fill it.
There is a possibility, in this environment, that they could develop the bomb, but it is not a real threat at this time, nor can we conclusively prove it. Certainly having a bomb would go a long way in giving Iran that pre-eminence. But the bomb is not the only road for Iran to gain this regional stature, and considering the time required for bomb construction, it might not be the most practical. All Iran needs to do, in order to get at least the popular support of the region, is be seen as able to stand up to American and Western influence.
With a measure of control over oil prices, and appeal to a vast regional and global Islamic population, we should be treading very lightly. We do not need to be weak, or appease them if there is a real threat of Iran going on the offensive, but we are not doing ourselves any favors by exaggerating our Congressional reports on the dangers posed by their nuclear program. This kind of behavior was exhibited before the Iraq invasion and has caused major headaches for the administration.
The natural reaction to aggression (i.e. punitive sanctions) is to tense up, tighten the grip, not open up and create more transparency in one’s nuclear program. With that in mind, would our punitive stance not push Iran towards developing the bomb, rather than away? They may see it as the only way to command our attention, and that is dangerous but avoidable through a policy of constructive engagement.